

Why Are Databases So Hard To Secure?

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Shmoocon 2008



your database maestros



THINK

- I want your balls!
- Ask for information
- Respect me, respect you



My Qualifications

- Guardian, www.guardian.com
- SA starting May 2001
- DBA starting Mar 2004



Caveat

- MySQL DBA
- Experience and familiarity with Oracle, SQL Server, Postgres, Sybase, DB2 but not an expert



Pythian's Qualifications

- SOX
- HIPAA
- FDA (ORA/OE)



Pythian's Qualifications

- Credit Cards
 - PCI
 - PCI Gateway
- EPD (European Privacy Directive)



Pythian's Customers

- Western Union
- Palm Coast Data
- www.pythian.com/aboutUs/customers.html



But enough of this palaver!

Let's get this show on the road.....



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General Security

- Patch me if you can!
- Prevent Access
- Prevent meaningful knowledge
 - Encryption
 - Permissions



Securing a Network

- Physical Access/Isolation
- Authentication
- Traffic Shaping
 - Content
 - Volume



Securing an Operating System

- Authentication
- Firewall
- Installed programs
- User ACLs

Securing 3rd Party Applications

- Authentication
- Configuration
- Content shaping



Securing Your Applications

- Authentication
- Configuration
- Be wary of user-entered data
 - Even if it's checked elsewhere



What is a Database?

- Structured collection of records
- Database usually means DBMS
 - Storage
 - Retrieval
 - Processing



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Database Security In General

- Who is responsible?
- Designed to store information
 - even/especially sensitive information
 - varied information
 - related information



Database Security In General

- Information gained in one part can damage another
- Access points can be many
 - DBMS controls permissions
 - OS/Network/Apps control access
 - Applications control interfaces



Application Vulnerabilities

- Compromised interface
 - any data the interface can access might be compromised
 - encryption algorithms can be compromised



But how?

(I'm glad you asked...otherwise I have to stand up here a long time while you throw shmooballs at me)



Auditing and Monitoring

- Prevention is one part of security
- Auditing - review and assess security
- Monitoring – alerting of security issues



Access Points

- Who can login?
 - Network, seeing traffic
 - <http://forge.mysql.com/snippets/view.php?id=15>
 - OS
 - Data
 - Logs
 - Backups



Who Can Login?

– Database

- From where? What can they do?
- What consequences can they bring about?

– Data

- ACLs on tables, columns, stored procedures
- Can use VIEWS
- What is sensitive?



GRANTing Access - Oracle

CREATE USER username

IDENTIFIED { BY password | EXTERNALLY | GLOBALLY AS
'external name' }

[DEFAULT TABLESPACE tablespace]

[TEMPORARY TABLESPACE { tablespace |
tablespace_group_name }]

[QUOTA { integer { K | M } ON tablespace } | UNLIMITED]

[PROFILE profile]

[PASSWORD EXPIRE]

[ACCOUNT { LOCK | UNLOCK }]



GRANTing Access - MySQL

```
GRANT priv_type [(column_list)] [, priv_type [(column_list)]] ...  
ON [object_type]  
    {tbl_name | * | *.* | db_name.* | db_name.routine_name}  
TO user [IDENTIFIED BY [PASSWORD] 'password']  
[REQUIRE     NONE | {{SSL| X509}}  
[CIPHER 'cipher' [AND]]     [ISSUER 'issuer' [AND]]  
[SUBJECT 'subject']] [WITH with_option [with_option] ...]
```


GRANTing Access - Postgres

```
CREATE USER name [ [ WITH ] option [ ... ] ]
```

where option can be:

SYSID uid

| CREATEDB | NOCREATEDB

| CREATEUSER | NOCREATEUSER

| IN GROUP groupname [, ...]

| [ENCRYPTED | UNENCRYPTED] PASSWORD 'password'

| VALID UNTIL 'abstime'



GRANTing Access – Microsoft SQL Server

```
CREATE USER user_name  
[ { { FOR | FROM }  
  {  
    LOGIN login_name | CERTIFICATE cert_name  
    | ASYMMETRIC KEY asym_key_name  
  }  
  | WITHOUT LOGIN  
]  
[ WITH DEFAULT_SCHEMA = schema_name ]
```



Other ACL's

- Object access
- Password policies
- Roles



Who + Where?

- user@host
- Server firewall
- Network firewall




And that's just ACL's!



your database maestros





your database maestros



Speaking of Users

- Who owns the application user account?
- Who is responsible for that security?



What + How

HI, THIS IS YOUR SON'S SCHOOL. WE'RE HAVING SOME COMPUTER TROUBLE.



OH, DEAR - DID HE BREAK SOMETHING?
IN A WAY--




DID YOU REALLY NAME YOUR SON Robert'); DROP TABLE Students;-- ?



OH, YES. LITTLE BOBBY TABLES, WE CALL HIM.

WELL, WE'VE LOST THIS YEAR'S STUDENT RECORDS. I HOPE YOU'RE HAPPY.



AND I HOPE YOU'VE LEARNED TO SANITIZE YOUR DATABASE INPUTS.



What + How

- Direct access
- Stored Procedures



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Encryption

- DB = another phase
- Still a hard issue



Application Insecurities

- Code itself
- Connection information
- Numeric/guessable ids
 - `index.php?id=743374`



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No Sex is Safe Sex

- “Safer”
- Risk assessment/management
- Orgy!



Liars

- Very little you can do




your database maestros



Good DB Security Books



- Implementing Database Security and Auditing, Ron Ben Natan
- Database Security and Auditing: Protecting Data Integrity and Accessibility – Hassan A. Afyouni





FoxTrot



by Bill Amend




QUICK!
CALL A
FARMER!



LET'S
TEACH
THE WORLD
TO SING!



AGE BEFORE BEAUTY, FELLAS!



Easy to remember:

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